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FISHERIES CASE 
( UNITED KINGDOM v. NORWAY )
Validity in international law
of Royal Norwegian Decree o f1935 delimiting Norwegian fisheries zone. 
Fisheries zone; territorial sea.
Special characteristics of Norwegian coast; “skjcergaard”. 
Baseline for measuring breadth of territorial sea; low-water mark. 
Outer coast line of “skjcergaard”.
Internal waters; territorial waters.
Tracé parallèle method; envelopes of arcs of circles method; 
straight base-lines method.
Length of straight base-lines; 10-mile rule for bays; historic waters. 
Straits; Indreleia.
International interest in delimitation of maritime areas.
General criteria for such delimitation; general direction of the coast; 
relationship between sea areas and land formations.
Norwegian system of delimitation 
regarded as adaptation of general international law. 
Consistency in application of this system.
Absence of opposition or reservations by foreign States. 
Notoriety.
Conformity of base-lines adopted by 1935 Decree with principles of 
international law applicable to delimitation of the territorial sea.
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JUDGMENT
Present: President BASDEVANT; Vice-President GUERRERO; 
Judges Alvarez, Hack-worth, Winiarski, Zoricic, De Visscher, Sir Arnold 
McNair, Klaestad, Badawi Pasha, Read, Hsu Mo; Registrar Hambro.
In the Fisheries case, 
between
the United Kingdom of G reat Britain and Northern Ireland,
represented by :
Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, 
as Agent,
assisted by:
The Right Honourable Sir Frank Soskice, K.C., M.P., Attorney- General, 
Professor C. H. M. Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E., K.C.,
Chichele Professor of Public International Law in the University of 
Oxford,
Mr. R. 0. Wilberforce, Member of the English Bar,
Mr. D. H. N. Johnson, Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign Office, 
as Counsel,
and by:
Commander R. H. Kennedy, O.B.E., R.N. (retired), Hydrographic 
Department, Admiralty,
Mr. W. H. Evans, Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,
M. Annaeus Schjodt, Jr., of the Norwegian Bar, Legal Adviser to the 
British Embassy in Oslo,
Mr. W. N. Hanna, Military Branch, Admiralty,
Mr. A. S. Armstrong, Fisheries Department, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries,
as expert advisers;
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and
the Kingdom of Norway,
represented b y :
M. Sven Amtzen, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Norway, 
as Agent and Counsel, 
assisted b y :
M. Maurice Bourquin, Professor at the University o f Geneva 
and at the Graduate Institute o f International Studies, as Counsel,
and by:
M. Paal Berg, former President o f the Supreme Court o f Norway,
M. C. J. Hambro, President o f the Odelsting,
M. Frede Castberg, Professor at the University o f Oslo,
M. Lars J. Jorstad, Minister Plenipotentiary,
Captain Chr. Meyer, o f the Norwegian Royal Navy,
M. Gunnar Rollefsen, Director o f the Research Bureau o f the 
Norwegian Department of Fisheries,
M. Reidar Skau, Judge o f the Supreme Court o f Norway,
M. E. A. Colban, Chief o f Division in the Norwegian Royal Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs,
Captain W. Coucheron-Aamot, o f the Norwegian Royal Navy,
M. Jens Evensen, o f the Bar o f the Norwegian Courts o f Appeal,
M. Andre Salomon, Doctor o f Law,
as experts,
and by:




T h e  C o u r t ,
composed as above,
delivers the following Judgment:
On September 28th, 1949, the Government o f the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland filed in the Registry 
an Application instituting proceedings before the Court against the 
Kingdom o f Norway, the subject o f the proceedings being the validity 
or otherwise, under international law, o f the lines o f delimitation o f 
the Norwegian fisheries zone laid down by the Royal Decree o f July 
12th, 1935, as amended by a Decree o f December 10th, 1937, for that 
part o f Norway which is situated northward o f 66° 28.8’ (or 66° 
28’48”) N  latitude. The Application refers to the Declarations by 
which the United Kingdom and Norway have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction o f the Court in accordance with Article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute.
This Application asked the Court
“(a) to declare the principles o f international law to be applied 
in defining the base-lines, by reference to which the Norwegian 
Government is entitled to delimit a fisheries zone, extending to 
seaward 4 sea miles from those lines and exclusively reserved for its 
own nationals, and to define the said base-lines in so far as it appears 
necessary, in the light o f the arguments o f the Parties, in order to avoid 
further legal differences between them;
(b) to award damages to the Government o f the United 
Kingdom in respect o f all interferences by the Norwegian authorities 
with British; fishing vessels outside the zone which, in accordance 
with the Court’s decision under (a), the Norwegian Government is 
entitled to reserve for its nationals.”
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, o f the Statute, the 
Application was notified to the States entitled to appear before the 
Court. It was also transmitted to the Secretary-General o f the United 
Nations.
The Pleadings were filed within the time-limits prescribed by 
Order o f November 9th, 1949, and later extended by Orders o f March 
29th and October 4th, 1950, and January 10th, 1951.
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By application o f Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Rules o f Court, 
they were communicated to the Governments o f Belgium, Canada, 
Cuba, Iceland, Sweden, the United States of America and Venezuela, 
at their request and with the authorization o f the Court. On September 
24th, 1951, the Court, by application of Article 44, paragraph 3, o f the 
Rules, at the instance o f the Government of Norway, and with the 
agreement of the United Kingdom Government, authorized the 
Pleadings to be made accessible to the public.
The case was ready for hearing on April 30th, 1951, and the 
opening o f the oral proceedings was fixed for September 25th, 1951. 
Public hearings were held on September 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 
29th, October 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 17th, 
18th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th and 29th. In the course of the 
hearings, the Court heard Sir Eric Beckett, Agent, Sir Frank Soskice, 
Mr. Wilberforce and Professor Waldock, Counsel, on behalf o f the 
United Kingdom Government; and M. Amtzen, Agent and Counsel, 
and Professor Bourquin, Counsel, on behalf of the Government of 
Norway. In addition, technical explanations were given on behalf of 
the United Kingdom Government by Commander Kennedy.
At the end o f his argument, the Agent of the United Kingdom 
Government presented the following submissions:
"The United Kingdom submits that the Court should decide that 
the maritime limits which Norway is entitled to enforce as against the 
United Kingdom should be drawn in accordance with the following 
principles: [p 120]
(1) That Norway is entitled to a belt o f territorial waters o f fixed 
breadth—the breadth cannot, as a maximum, exceed 4 sea miles.
(2) That, in consequence, the outer limit o f Norway’s territorial 
waters must never be more than 4 sea miles from some point on the 
base-line.
(3) That, subject to (4) (9) and (10) below, the base-line must be 
low-water mark on permanently dry land (which is part o f Norwegian 
territory) or the proper closing line (see (7) below) of Norwegian 
internal waters.
(4) That, where there is a low-tide elevation situated within 4 sea
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miles o f permanently dry land, or o f the proper closing line o f 
Norwegian internal waters, the outer limit o f territorial waters may be 
4 sea miles from the outer edge (at low tide) o f this low-tide elevation. 
In no other case may a low-tide elevation be taken into account.
(5) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian internal 
waters, on historic grounds, all fjords and sunds which fall within the 
conception o f a bay as denned in international law, whether the proper 
entrance to the indentation is more or less than 10 sea miles wide.
(6) That the definition o f a bay in international law is a well- 
marked indentation, whose penetration inland is in such proportion to 
the width of its mouth as to constitute the indentation more than a 
mere curvature o f the coast.
(7) That, where an area o f water is a bay, the principle which 
determines where the closing line should be drawn, is that the closing 
line should be drawn between the natural geographical entrance points 
where the indentation ceases to have the configuration o f a bay.
(8) That a legal strait is any geographical strait which connects 
two portions o f the high seas.
(9) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian territorial 
waters, on historic grounds, all the waters o f the fjords and sunds 
which have the character o f a legal strait. Where the maritime belts, 
drawn from each shore, overlap at each end o f the strait, the limit o f 
territorial waters is formed by the outer rims o f these two maritime 
belts. Where, however, the maritime belts so drawn do not overlap, 
the limit follows the outer rims of- each o f these two maritime belts, 
until they intersect with the straight line, joining the natural entrance 
points o f the strait, after which intersection the limit follows that 
straight line.
(10) That, in the case o f the Vestfjord, the outer limit o f 
Norwegian territorial waters, at the south-westerly end o f the fjord, is 
the pecked green line shown on Charts Nos. 8 and 9 of Annex 35 of 
the Reply, [p 121]
(11) That Norway, by reason of her historic title to fjords and 
sunds, is entitled to claim, either as territorial or as internal waters, the 
areas of water lying between the island fringe and the mainland it
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Norway. In order to determine what areas must be deemed to lie 
between the islands and the mainland, and whether these areas are 
territorial or internal waters, recourse must be had to Nos. (6) and (8) 
above, being the definitions o f a bay and o f a legal strait.
(12) That Norway is not entitled, as against the United 
Kingdom, to enforce any claim to waters not covered by the 
preceding principles. As between Norway and the United 
Kingdom, waters off the coast o f Norway north o f  parallel 66° 
28.8’ N., which are not Norwegian by virtue o f the above- 
mentioned principles, are high seas.
(13) That Norway is under an international obligation to pay to 
the United Kingdom compensation in respect o f all the arrests since 
16th September, 1948, of British fishing vessels in waters, which are 
high seas by virtue o f the application of the preceding principles."
Later, the Agent of the United Kingdom Government presented 
the following Conclusions, at the end of his oral reply:
"The United Kingdom submits that the Court should decide that 
the maritime limits which Norway is entitled to enforce as against the 
United Kingdom should be drawn in accordance with the following 
principles:
(1) That Norway is entitled to a belt o f  territorial waters o f fixed 
breadth—the breadth cannot, as a maximum, exceed 4 sea miles.
(2) That, in consequence, the outer limit o f Norway’s territorial 
waters must never be more than 4 sea miles from some point on the 
base-line.
(3) That, subject to Nos. (4), (9) and (10) below, the base-line 
must be low-water mark on permanently dry land (which is part of 
Norwegian territory) or the proper closing line (see No. (7) below) of 
Norwegian internal waters.
(4) That, where there is a low-tide elevation situated within 4 sea 
miles o f permanently dry land, or o f the proper closing line of 
Norwegian internal waters, the outer limit o f Norwegian territorial 
waters may be 4 sea miles from the outer edge (at low tide) o f this 
low-tide elevation. In no other case may a low-tide elevation be taken 
into account.
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(5) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian internal 
waters, on historic grounds, all fjords and surds which fall within the 
conception of a bay as defined in international law (see No. (6) 
below), whether the proper closing line of the indendation is more or 
less than 10 sea miles long.fp 122]
(6) That the definition of a bay in international law is a well- 
marked indentation, whose penetration inland is in such proportion to 
the width of its mouth as to constitute the indentation more than a 
mere curvature o f the coast.
(7) That, where an area o f water is a bay, the principle which 
determines where the closing line should be drawn, is that the closing 
line should be drawn between the natural geographical entrance points 
where the indentation ceases to have the configuration o f a bay.
(8) That a legal strait is any geographical strait which connects 
two portions o f the high seas.
(9) (a) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian territorial 
waters, on historic grounds, all the waters o f the fjords and sunds 
which have the character of legal straits.
(b) Where the maritime belts drawn from each shore overlap at 
each end o f the strait, the limit o f territorial waters is formed by the 
outer rims o f these two maritime belts. Where, however, the maritime 
belts so drawn do not overlap, the limit follows the outer rims of each 
o f these two maritime belts, until they intersect with the straight line, 
joining the natural entrance points of the strait, after which 
intersection the limit follows that straight line.
(10) That, in the case of the Vcstfjord. the outer limit of 
Norwegian territorial waters, at the south-westerly end o f the fjord, is 
the pecked green line shown on Charts Nos. 8 and 9 o f Annex 35 of 
the Reply.
(11) That Norway, by reason o f her historic title to fjords and 
sunds (see Nos. (5) and (9) (a) above), is entitled to claim, either as 
internal or as territorial waters, the areas o f water lying between the 
island fringe and the mainland o f Norway. In order to determine what 
areas must be deemed to lie between the island fringe and the 
mainland, and whether these areas are internal or territorial waters, the
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principles o f Nos. (6), (7), (8) and (9) (b) must be applied to 
indentations in the island fringe and to indentations between the island 
fringe and the mainland—those areas which lie in indentations having 
the character o f bays, and within the proper closing lines thereof, 
being deemed to be internal waters; and those areas which lie in 
indentations having the character o f legal straits, and within the proper 
limits thereof, being deemed to be territorial waters.
(12) That Norway is not entitled, as against the United 
Kingdom, to enforce any claims to waters not covered by the 
preceding principles. As between Norway and the United Kingdom, 
waters off the coast o f Norway north o f parallel 66° 28.8’ N., which 
are not Norwegian by virtue o f the above-mentioned principles, are 
high seas, [p 123]
(13) That the Norwegian Royal Decree o f 12th July, 1935, is not 
enforceable against the United Kingdom to the extent that it claims as 
Norwegian waters (internal or territorial waters) areas o f water not 
covered by Nos. (I)-(II).
(14) That Norway is under an international obligation to pay to 
the United Kingdom compensation is respect o f all the arrests since 
16th September, 1948, of British fishing vessels in waters which are 
high seas by virtue o f the application of the preceding principles.
Alternatively to Nos. (1) to (13) (if the Court should decide to 
determine by its judgment the exact limits o f the territorial waters 
which Norway is entitled to enforce against the United Kingdom), that 
Norway is not entitled as against the United Kingdom to claim as 
Norwegian waters any areas of water off the Norwegian coasts north 
of parallel 66° 28.8’ N. which are outside the pecked green line drawn 
on the charts which form Annex 35 o f the Reply.
Alternatively to Nos. (8) to (n) (if the Court should hold that the 
waters o f the Indreleia are Norwegian internal waters), the following 
are substituted for Nos. (8) to (II):
I. That, in the case o f the Vestfjord, the outer limit o f Norwegian 
territorial waters at the south-westerly end o f the fjord is a line drawn 
4 sea miles seawards o f a line joining the Skomvar lighthouse at Rost 
to Kalsholmen lighthouse in Tennholmeme until the intersection of
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the former line with the arcs of circles in the pecked green line shown 
on Charts 8 and 9 of Annex 35 of the Reply.
II. That Norway, by reason of her historic title to fjords and 
sunds, is entitled to claim as internal waters the areas of water lying 
between the island fringe and the mainland of Norway. In order to 
determine what areas must be deemed to lie between the island fringe 
and the mainland, the principles o f Nos. (6) and (7) above must be 
applied to the indentations in the island fringe and to the indentations 
between the island fringe and the mainland— those areas which lie in 
indentations having the character o f bays, and within the proper 
closing lines thereof, being deemed to lie between the island fringe 
and the mainland."
At the end o f his argument, the Norwegian Agent presented, on 
behalf o f his government, the following submissions, which he did not 
modify in his oral rejoinder:
"Having regard to the fact that the Norwegian Royal Decree o f 
July 12th, 1935, is not inconsistent with the rules o f international law 
binding upon Norway, and having regard to the lact that Norway 
possesses, in any event, an historic title to all the waters included 
within the limits laid down by that decree.
May it please the Court, in one single judgment, rejecting all 
submissions to the contrary, to adjudge and declare that the 
delimitation o f the fisheries zone fixed by the Norwegian Royal 
Decree of July 12th, 1935, is not contrary to international law."
The facts which led the United Kingdom to bring the case 
before the Court are briefly as follows.
The historical facts laid before the Court establish that as the 
result of complaints from the King o f Denmark and o f Norway, at the 
beginning o f the seventeenth century, British fishermen refrained from 
fishing in Norwegian coastal waters for a long period, from 16lb- 
1618 until 1906.
In 1906 a few British fishing vessels appeared off the coasts of 
Eastern Finnmark. From 1908 onwards they returned in greater 
numbers. These were trawlers equipped with improved and powerful
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gear. The local population became perturbed, and measures were 
taken by the Norwegian Government with a view to specifying the 
limits within which fishing was prohibited to foreigners.
The first incident occurred in 1911 when a British trawler was 
seized and condemned for having violated these measures. 
Negotiations ensued between the two Governments. These were 
interrupted by the war in 1914. From 1922 onwards incidents 
recurred. Further conversations were initiated in 1924. In 1932, 
British trawlers, extending the range o f their activities, appeared in the 
sectors off the Norwegian coast west o f the North Cape, and the 
number o f warnings and arrests increased. On July 27th, 1933, the 
United Kingdom Government sent a memorandum to the Norwegian 
Government complaining that in delimiting the territorial sea the 
Norwegian authorities had made use o f unjustifiable base-lines. On 
July 12th, 1935, a Norwegian Royal Decree was enacted delimiting 
the Norwegian fisheries zone north o f 66° 28.8’ North latitude.
The United Kingdom made urgent representations in Oslo in the 
course of which the question o f referring the dispute to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice was raised. Pending the result o f the 
negotiations, the Norwegian Government made it known that 
Norwegian fishery patrol vessels would deal leniently with foreign 
vessels fishing a certain distance within the fishing limits. In 1948, since 
no agreement had been reached, the Norwegian Government abandoned 
its lenient enforcement of the 1935 Decree; [p 125] incidents then 
became more and more frequent. A considerable number of British 
trawlers were arrested and condemned. It was then that the United
Kingdom Government instituted the present proceedings.
***
The Norwegian Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935, concerning the 
delimitation o f the Norwegian fisheries zone sets out in the preamble the 
considerations on which its provisions are based. In this connection it 
refers to "well-established national titles of right", "the geographical 
conditions prevailing on the Norwegian coasts", "the safeguard of the 
vital interests of the inhabitants of the northernmost parts of the 
country"; it further relies on the Royal Decrees of February 22nd, 1812,
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October 16th, 1869, January 5th, 1881, and September 9th, 1889.
The Decree provides that "lines of delimitation towards the high 
sea of the Norwegian fisheries zone as regards that part o f Norway 
which is situated northward of 66° 28.8’ North latitude .... shall run 
parallel with straight base-lines drawn between fixed points on the 
mainland, on islands or rocks, starting from the final point of the 
boundary line of the Realm in the easternmost part o f the 
Varangerfjord and going as far as Trama in the County o f Nordland". 
An appended schedule indicates the fixed points between which the 
base-lines are drawn.
The subject o f the dispute is clearly indicated under point 8 of 
the Application instituting proceedings: "The subject o f the dispute is 
the validity or otherwise under international law of the lines of 
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone laid down by the Royal 
Decree of 1935 for that part of Norway which is situated northward o f 
66° 28.8’ North latitude." And further on: " .... the question at issue 
between the two Governments is whether the lines prescribed by the 
Royal Decree of 1935 as the base-lines for the delimitation o f the 
fisheries zone have or have not been drawn in accordance with the 
applicable rules of international law".
Although the Decree o f July 12th, 1935, refers to the Norwegian 
fisheries zone and does not specifically mention the territorial sea, 
there can be no doubt that the zone delimited by this Decree is none 
other than the sea area which Norway considers to be her territorial 
sea. That is how the Parties argued the question and that is the way in 
which they submitted it to the Court for decision.
The Submissions presented by the Agent o f the Norwegian 
Government correspond to the subject o f the dispute as indicated in 
the Application.
The propositions formulated by the Agent of the United 
Kingdom Government at the end o f his first speech and revised by 
him at the end of his oral reply under the heading of "Conclusions" are 
more complex in character and must be dealt with in detail.
Points I and 2 of these "Conclusions" refer to the extent of 
Norway’s territorial sea. This question is not the subject of the present
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dispute. In fact, the 4-mile limit claimed by Norway was 
acknowledged by the United Kingdom in the course o f the 
proceedings.
Points 12 and 13 appear to be real Submissions which accord 
with the United Kingdom’s conception o f international law as sot out 
under points 3 to 11.
Points 3 to 11 appear to be a set o f propositions which, in the 
form of definitions, principles or rules, purport to justify certain 
contentions and do not constitute a precise and direct statement o f a 
claim. The subject of the dispute being quite concrete, the Court 
cannot entertain the suggestion made by the Agent o f the United 
Kingdom Government at the sitting o f October 1st, 1951, that the 
Court should deliver a Judgment which for the moment would confine 
itself to adjudicating on the definitions, principles or rules stated, a 
suggestion which, moreover, was objected to by the Agent o f the 
Norwegian Government at the sitting o f October 5th, 1951. These are 
elements which might furnish reasons in support o f the Judgment, but 
cannot constitute the decision. It further follows that even understood 
in this way, these elements may be taken into account only in so far as 
they would appear to be relevant for deciding the sole question in 
dispute, namely, the validity or otherwise under international law of 
the lines o f delimitation laid down by the 1935 Decree.
Point 14, which seeks to secure a decision o f principle 
concerning Norway’s obligation to pay to the United Kingdom 
compensation in respect o f all arrests since September 16th, 1948, of 
British fishing vessels in waters found to be high seas, need not be 
considered, since the Parties had agreed to leave this question to 
subsequent settlement if  it should arise.
The claim of the United Kingdom Government is founded on 
what it regards as the general international law applicable to the 
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone.
The Norwegian Government does not deny that there exist rules 
o f international law to which this delimitation must conform. It 
contends that the propositions formulated by the United Kingdom 
Government in its "Conclusions" do not possess the character
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attributed to them by that Government. It further relies on its own 
system of delimitation which it asserts to be in every respect in 
conformity with the requirements o f international law.
The Court will examine in turn these various aspects o f the 
claim of the United Kingdom and of the defence o f the Norwegian
Government.
***
The coastal zone concerned in the dispute is o f considerable 
length. It lies north o f latitude 66° 28.8’ N., that is to say, north o f the 
Arctic Circle, and it includes the coast of the mainland o f Norway and 
all the islands, islets, rocks and reefs, known by the name o f the 
"skjsergaard" (literally, rock rampart), together with all Norwegian 
internal and territorial waters. The coast o f the mainland, which, 
without taking any account of fjords, bays and minor indentations, is 
over 1,500 kilometres in length, is o f a very distinctive configuration. 
Very broken along its whole length, it constantly opens out into 
indentations often penetrating for great distances inland: the Por 
Sanger fjord, for instance, penetrates 75 sea miles inland. To the west, 
the land configuration stretches out into the sea: the large and small 
islands, mountainous in character, the islets, rocks and reefs, some 
always above water, others emerging only at low tide, are in truth but 
an extension o f the Norwegian mainland. The number o f insular 
formations, large and small, which make up the " skjsergaard ", is 
estimated by the Norwegian Government to be one hundred and 
twenty thousand. From the southern extremity o f the disputed area to 
the North Cape, the " skjsergaard " lies along the whole o f the coast of 
the mainland; east o f the North Cape, the " skjsergaard " ends, but the 
coast line continues to be broken by large and deeply indented fjords.
Within the " skjsergaard ", almost every island has its large and 
its small bays; countless arms o f the sea, straits, channels and mere 
waterways serve as a means o f communication for the local 
population which inhabits the islands as it does the mainland. The 
coast o f the mainland does not constitute, as it does in practically all 
other countries, a clear dividing line between land and sea. What 
matters, what really constitutes the Norwegian coast line, is the outer
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line of the " skjsergaard
The whole o f this region is mountainous. The North Cape, a 
sheer rock little more than 300 metres high, can be seen from a 
considerable distance; there are other summits rising to over a 
thousand metres, so that the Norwegian coast, mainland and 
"skjaergaard", is visible from far off.
Along the coast are situated comparatively shallow banks, 
veritable under-water terraces which constitute fishing grounds where 
fish are particularly abundant ; these grounds were known to Nor­
wegian fishermen and exploited by them from time immemorial. 
Since these banks lay within the range o f vision, the most desirable 
fishing grounds were always located and identified by means o f the 
method o f alignments ("meds"), at points where two lines drawn 
between points selected on the coast or on islands intersected, [p 128]
In these barren regions the inhabitants o f the coastal zone derive 
their livelihood essentially from fishing.
Such are the realities which must be borne in mind in appraising 
the validity o f the United Kingdom contention that the limits o f the 
Norwegian fisheries zone laid down in the 1935 Decree are contrary 
to international law.
The Parties being in agreement on the figure o f 4 miles for the 
breadth of the territorial sea, the problem which arises is from what 
base-line this breadth is to be reckoned. The Conclusions o f the 
United Kingdom are explicit on this point: the base-line must be low- 
water mark on permanently dry land which is a part of Norwegian 
territory, or the proper closing line of Norwegian internal waters.
The Court has no difficulty in finding that, for the purpose of 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water mark as 
opposed to the high-water mark, or the mean between the two tides, 
which has generally been adopted in the practice o f States. This 
criterion is the most favourable to the coastal State and clearly shows 
the character of territorial waters as appurtenant to the land territory. 
The Court notes that the Parties agree as to this criterion, but that they 
differ as to its application.
The Parties also agree that in the case of a low-tide elevation
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(drying rock) the outer edge at low water o f this low-tide elevation 
maybe taken into account as a base-point for calculating the breadth o f 
the territorial sea. The Conclusions o f the United Kingdom 
Government add a condition which is not admitted by Norway, 
namely, that, in order to be taken into account, a drying rock must be 
situated within 4 miles o f permanently dry land. However, the Court 
does not consider it necessary to deal with this question, inasmuch as 
Norway has succeeded in proving, after both Parties had given their 
interpretation o f the charts, that in fact none o f the drying rocks used 
by her as base points is more than 4 miles from permanently dry land.
The Court finds itself obliged to decide whether the relevant 
low-water mark is that o f the mainland or o f the "skjaeigaard". Since 
the mainland is bordered in its western sector by the "skjaeigaard", 
which constitutes a whole with the mainland, it is the outer line o f the 
"skjaergaard" which must be taken into account in delimiting the belt 
o f Norwegian territorial waters. This solution is dictated by 
geographic realities.
Three methods have been contemplated to effect the 
application o f the low-water mark rule. The simplest would appear 
to be the method of the trace parallele, which consists o f drawing the 
outer limit of the belt o f territorial waters by following the coast in 
all its sinuosities. This method may be applied without difficulty to 
an ordinary coast, which is not too broken. Where a coast is deeply 
[p 129] indented and cut into, as is that o f Eastern Finnmark, or 
where it is bordered by an archipelago such as the " skjaergaard " 
along the western sector of the coast here in question, the base-line 
becomes independent of the low-water mark, and can only be 
determined by means o f a geometrical construction. In such 
circumstances the line o f the low-water mark can no longer be put 
forward as a rule requiring the coastline to be followed in all its 
sinuosities. Nor can one characterize as exceptions to the rule the 
very many derogations which would be necessitated by such a 
rugged coast: the rule would disappear under the exceptions. Such a 
coast, viewed as a whole, calls for the application o f a different 
method; that is, the method of base-lines which, within reasonable
LEX PORTUS №  1 ’2 0 1 6 215
limits, may depart from the physical line o f the coast.
It is true that the experts o f the Second Sub-Committee of the 
Second Committee o f the 1930 Conference for the codification of 
international law formulated the low-water mark rule somewhat 
strictly ("following all the sinuosities of the coast"). But they were at 
the same time obliged to admit many exceptions relating to bays, 
islands near the coast, groups o f islands. In the present case this 
method of the trace paraliele, which was invoked against Norway in 
the Memorial, was abandoned in the written Reply, and later in the 
oral argument o f the Agent of the United Kingdom Government. 
Consequently, it is no longer relevant to the case. "On the other hand", 
it is said in the Reply, the courbe tangente—or, in English, ‘envelopes 
of arcs o f circles’—method is the method which the United Kingdom 
considers to be the correct one"
The arcs of circles method, which is constantly used for 
determining the position o f a point or object at sea, is a new technique 
in so far as it is a method for delimiting the territorial sea. This 
technique was proposed by the United States delegation at the 1930 
Conference for the codification o f international law. Its purpose is to 
secure the application o f the principle that the belt o f  territorial waters 
must follow the line o f the coast. It is not obligatory by law, as was 
admitted by Counsel for the United Kingdom Government in his oral 
reply. In these circumstances, and although certain o f the Conclusions 
of the United Kingdom are founded on the application o f the arcs of 
circles method, the Court considers that it need not deal with these 
Conclusions in so far as they are based upon this method.
The principle that the belt of territorial waters must follow the 
general direction o f the coast makes it possible to fix certain criteria 
valid for any delimitation o f the territorial sea; these criteria will be 
elucidated later. The Court will confine itself at this stage to noting 
that, in order to apply this principle, several States have deemed it 
necessary to follow the straight base-lines method and that they have 
not encountered objections of principle by other States. This method 
consists of selecting appropriate points on the [p 130] low-water mark 
and drawing straight lines between them. This has been done, not only
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in the case o f well-defined bays, but also in cases o f minor curvatures 
o f the coast line where it was solely a question o f giving a simpler 
form to the belt of territorial waters.
It has been contended, on behalf o f the United Kingdom, that 
Norway may draw straight lines only across bays. The Court is unable 
to share this view. If the belt of territorial waters must follow the outer 
lineof the "skjærgaard", and if  the method of straight baselines must 
be admitted in certain cases, there is no valid reason to draw them 
only across bays, as in Eastern Finnmark, and not also to draw them 
between islands, islets and rocks, across the sea areas separating them, 
even when such areas do not fall within the conception o f a bay. It is 
sufficient that they should be situated between the island formations of 
the "skjaergaard", inter fauces terrarum.
The United Kingdom Government concedes that straight lines, 
regardless o f their length, may be used only subject to the conditions 
set out in point 5 of its Conclusions, as follows:
"Norway is entitled to claim as -Norwegian internal waters, on 
historic grounds, all ijords and sunds which fall within the conception 
of a bay as defined in international law (see No. (6) below), whether 
the proper closing line o f the indentation is more or less than 10 sea 
miles long."
A preliminary remark must be made in respect o f this point.
In the opinion o f the United Kingdom Government, Norway is 
entitled, on historic grounds, to claim as internal waters all Ijords and 
sunds which have the character o f a bay. She is also entitled on 
historic grounds to claim as Norwegian territorial waters all the waters 
o f the Ijords and sunds which have the character o f legal straits 
(Conclusions, point 9), and, either as internal or as territorial waters, 
the areas o f water lying between the island fringe and the mainland 
(point 11 and second alternative Conclusion II).
By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated 
as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not 
for the existence o f an historic title. The United Kingdom Government 
refers to the notion o f historic titles both in respect o f territorial waters 
and internal waters, considering such titles, in both cases, as
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derogations from general international law. In its opinion Norway can 
justify the claim that these waters are territorial or internal on the 
ground that she has exercised the necessary jurisdiction over them for 
a long period without opposition from other States, a kind o f - 
possessio longi temporis, with the result that her jurisdiction over 
these waters must now be recognized although it constitutes a 
derogation from the rules in force, [p 131]
Norwegian sovereignty over these waters would constitute an 
exception, historic titles justifying situations which would otherwise 
be in conflict with international law.
As has been said, the United Kingdom Government concedes 
that Norway is entitled to claim as internal waters all the waters of 
fjords and sunds which fall within the conception o f a bay as defined 
in international law whether the closing line o f the indentation is more 
or less than ten sea miles long. But the United Kingdom Government 
concedes this only on the basis of historic title; it must therefore be 
taken that that Government has not abandoned its contention that the 
ten-mile rule is to be regarded as a rule of international law.
In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out 
that although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in 
their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although 
certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other 
States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has 
not acquired the authority o f a general rule o f international law.
In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as 
against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to 
apply it to the Norwegian coast.
The Court now comes to the question o f the length o f the 
baselines drawn across the waters lying between the various 
formations o f the "skjaergaard". Basing itself on the analogy with the 
alleged general rule o f ten miles relating to bays, the United Kingdom 
Government still maintains on this point that the length o f straight 
lines must not exceed ten miles.
In this connection, the practice o f States does not justify the 
formulation o f any general rule o f law. The attempts that have been
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made to subject groups o f islands or coastal archipelagoes to 
conditions analogous to the limitations concerning bays (distance 
between the islands not exceeding twice the breadth o f the territorial 
waters, or ten or twelve sea miles), have not got beyond the stage o f 
proposals.
Furthermore, apart from any question o f limiting the lines to ten 
miles, it may be that several lines can be envisaged. In such cases the 
coastal State would seem to be in the best position to appraise the 
local conditions dictating the selection.
Consequently, the Court is unable to share the view o f the 
United Kingdom Government, that "Norway, in the matter o f base­
lines, now claims recognition o f an exceptional system". As will be 
shown later, all that the Court can see therein is the application o f 
general international law to a specific case.
The Conclusions of the United Kingdom, points 5 and 9 to n, 
refer to waters situated between the base-lines and the Norwegian 
mainland. The Court is asked to hold that on historic grounds these 
waters belong to Norway, but that they are divided into two 
categories: territorial and internal waters, in accordance with two 
criteria which the Conclusions regard as well founded in international 
law, the waters falling within the conception of a bay being deemed to 
be internal waters, and those having the character o f legal straits being 
deemed to be territorial waters.
As has been conceded by the United Kingdom, the " skjrergaard " 
constitutes a whole with the Norwegian mainland; the waters between 
the base-lines of the belt of territorial waters and the mainland are 
internal waters. However, according to the argument of the United 
Kingdom a portion of these waters constitutes territorial waters. These 
are inter alia the waters followed by the navigational route known as the 
Indreleia. It is contended that since these waters have this character, 
certain consequences arise with regard to the determination of the 
territorial waters at the end of this water-way considered as a maritime 
strait.
The Court is bound to observe that the Indreleia is not a strait at 
all, but rather a navigational route prepared as such by means of
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artificial aids to navigation provided by Norway. In these 
circumstances the Court is unable to accept the view that the Indreleia, 
for the purposes of the present case, has a status different from that of 
the other waters included in the " sk jasrgaard
Thus the Court, confining itself for the moment to the 
Conclusions o f the United Kingdom, finds that the Norwegian 
Government in fixing the base-lines for the delimitation o f the 
Norwegian fisheries zone by the 1935 Decree has not violated
international law.
* * *
It does not at all follow that, in the absence o f rules having the 
technically precise character alleged by the United Kingdom 
Government, the delimitation undertaken by the Norwegian 
Government in 1935 is not subject to certain principles which make it 
possible to judge as to its validity under international law. The 
delimitation o f sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot 
be dependent merely upon the will o f the coastal State as expressed in 
its municipal law. Although it is true that the act o f delimitation is 
necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is 
competent to undertake it, the validity o f the delimitation with regard 
to other States depends upon international law.
In this connection, certain basic considerations inherent in the 
nature o f the territorial sea, bring to light certain criteria which, though 
not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for 
their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse, facts in question.
Among these considerations, some reference must be made to the 
close dependence o f the territorial sea upon the land domain. It is the 
land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the waters off its 
coasts. It follows that while such a State must be allowed the latitude 
necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to practical needs 
and local requirements, the drawing o f base-lines must not depart to any 
appreciable extent from the general direction o f the coast.
Another fundamental consideration, o f particular importance in 
this case, is the more or less close relationship existing between 
certain sea areas and the land formations which divide or surround
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them. The real question raised in the choice o f base-lines is in effect 
whether certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime o f 
internal waters. This idea, which is at the basis o f the determination o f 
the rules relating to bays, should be liberally applied in the case o f a 
coast, the geographical configuration o f which is as unusual as that of. 
Norway.
Finally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the 
scope o f which extends beyond purely geographical factors: that o f 
certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and 
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.
Norway puts forward the 1935 Decree as the application o f a 
traditional system of delimitation, a system which she claims to be in 
complete conformity with international law. The Norwegian 
Government has referred in this connection to an historic title, the 
meaning of which was made clear by Counsel for Norway at the 
sitting on October 12th, 1951: "The Norwegian Government does not 
rely upon history to justify exceptional rights, to claim areas o f sea 
which the general law would deny; it invokes history, together with 
other factors, to justify the way in which it applies the general law." 
This conception o f an historic title is in consonance with the 
Norwegian Government’s understanding o f the general rules o f 
international law. In its view, these rules o f international law take into 
account the diversity o f facts and, therefore, concede that the drawing 
o f base-lines must be adapted to the special conditions obtaining in 
different regions. In its view, the system o f delimitation applied in 
1935, a system characterized by the use o f straight lines, does not 
therefore infringe the general law; it is an adaptation rendered 
necessary by local conditions.
The Court must ascertain precisely what this alleged system o f 
delimitation consists of, what is its effect in law as against the United 
Kingdom, and whether it was applied by the 1935 Decree in a manner 
which conformed to international law.
It is common ground between the Parties that on the question o f 
the existence o f a Norwegian system, the Royal Decree o f February
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22nd, 1812, is o f cardinal importance. This Decree is in the following 
terms: "We wish to lay down as a rule that, in all cases when there is a 
question o f determining the limit o f our territorial sovereignty at sea, 
that limit shall be reckoned at the distance o f one ordinary sea league 
from the island or islet farthest from the mainland, not covered by the 
sea; o f which all proper authorities shall be informed by rescript."
This text does not clearly indicate how the base-lines between 
the islands or islets farthest from the mainland were to be drawn. In 
particular, it does not say in express terms that the lines must take the 
form o f straight lines drawn between these points. But it may be noted 
that it was in this way that the 1812 Decree was invariably construed 
in Norway in the course o f the 19th and 20th centuries.
The Decree o f October 16th, 1869, relating to the delimitation of 
Sunnmore, and the Statement o f Reasons for this Decree, are 
particularly revealing as to the traditional Norwegian conception and 
the Norwegian construction o f the Decree o f 1812. It was by reference 
to the 1812 Decree, and specifically relying upon "the conception" 
adopted by that Decree, that the Ministry o f the Interior justified the 
drawing of a straight line 26 miles in length between the two 
outermost points o f the "skjaergaard". The Decree o f September 9th, 
1889, relating to the delimitation o f Romsdal and Nordmdre, applied 
the same method, drawing four straight lines, respectively 14.7 miles, 
7 miles, 23.6 miles and 11.6 miles in length.
The 1812 Decree was similarly construed by the Territorial 
Waters Boundary Commission (Report o f February 29th, 1912, pp. 
48-49), as it was in the Memorandum o f January 3rd, 1929, sent by 
the Norwegian Government to the Secretary-General o f the League of 
Nations, in which it was said : "The direction laid down by this 
Decree should be interpreted in the sense that the starting-point for 
calculating the breadth o f the territorial waters should be a line drawn 
along the ‘skjaergaard’ between the furthest rocks and, where there is 
no ‘skjreigaard’, between the extreme points." The judgment delivered 
by the Norwegian Supreme Court in 1934, in the St. Just case, 
provided final authority for this interpretation. This conception 
accords with the geographical characteristics o f the Norwegian coast
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and is not contrary to the principles o f international law. [p 135]
It should, however, be pointed out that whereas the 1812 Decree 
designated as base-points "the island or islet farthest from the 
mainland not covered by the sea", Norwegian governmental practice 
subsequently interpreted this provision as meaning that the limit was 
to be reckoned from the outermost islands and islets "not continuously 
covered by the sea".
The 1812 Decree, although quite general in its terms, had as its 
immediate object the fixing o f the limit applicable for the purposes o f 
maritime neutrality. However, as soon as the Norwegian Government 
found itself impelled by circumstances to delimit its fisheries zone, it 
regarded that Decree as laying down principles to be applied for 
purposes other than neutrality. The Statements o f Reasons o f October 
1st, 1869, December 20th, 1880, and May 24th, 1889, are conclusive 
on this point. They also show that the delimitation effected in 1869 
and in 1889 constituted a reasoned application o f a definite system 
applicable to the whole o f the Norwegian coast line, and was not 
merely legislation of local interest called for by any special 
requirements. The following passage from the Statement o f Reasons 
of the 1869 Decree may in particular be referred to: "My Ministry 
assumes that the general rule mentioned above [namely, the four-mile 
rule], which is recognized by international law for the determination 
of the extent of a country’s territorial waters, must be applied here in 
such a way that the sea area inside a line drawn parallel to a straight 
line between the two outermost islands or rocks not covered by the 
sea, Svinoy to the south and Storholmen to the north, and one 
geographical league north-west of that straight line, should be 
considered Norwegian maritime territory."
The 1869 Statement of Reasons brings out all the elements 
which go to make up what the Norwegian Government describes as its 
traditional system of delimitation: base-points provided by the islands 
or islets farthest from the mainland, the use of straight lines joining up 
these points, the lack of any maximum length for such lines. The 
judgment of the Norwegian Supreme Court in the St. Just case upheld 
this interpretation and added that the 1812 Decree had never been
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understood or applied "in such a way as to make the boundary follow 
the sinuosities of the coast or to cause its position to be determined by 
means of circles drawn round the points of the Skjsergaard or o f the 
mainland furthest out to sea—a method which it would be very 
difficult to adopt or to enforce in practice, having regard to the special 
configuration o f this coast". Finally, it is established that, according to 
the Norwegian system, the base-lines must follow the general 
direction o f the coast, which is in conformity with international law.
Equally significant in this connection is the correspondence 
which passed between Norway and France between 1869-1870. On 
December 21st, 1869, only two months after the promulgation [p 136] 
of the Decree o f October 16th relating to the delimitation of 
Sunnmore, the French Government asked the Norwegian Government 
for an explanation of this enactment. It did so basing itself upon "the 
principles o f international law". In a second Note dated December 
30th o f the same year, it pointed out that the distance between the 
base-points was greater than 10 sea miles, and that the line joining up 
these points should have been a broken line following the 
configuration of the coast. In a Note o f February 8th, 1870, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, also dealing with the question from the 
point o f view o f international law, replied as follows:
"By the same Note o f December 30th, Your Excellency drew 
my attention to the fixing o f the fishery limit in the Sunnmore 
Archipelago by a straight line instead o f a broken line. According to 
the view held by your Government, as the distance between the islets 
o f Svinoy and Storholmen is more than 10 sea miles, the fishery limit 
between these two points should have been a broken line following 
the configuration o f the coast line and nearer to it than the present 
limit. In spite o f the adoption in some treaties o f the quite arbitrary 
distance o f 10 sea miles, this distance would not appear to me to have 
acquired the force o f an international law. Still less would it appear to 
have any foundation in reality: one bay, by reason o f the varying 
formations o f the coast and sea-bed, may have an entirely different 
character from that o f another bay o f the same width. It seems to me 
rather that local conditions and considerations o f what is practicable
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and equitable should be decisive in specific cases. The configuration 
o f our coasts in no way resembles that o f the coasts o f other European 
countries, and that fact alone makes the adoption o f any absolute rule 
o f universal application impossible in this case.
I venture to claim that all these reasons militate in favour o f the 
line laid down by the Decree of October 16th. A broken line, 
conforming closely to the indentations o f the coast line between 
Svinoy and Storholmen, would have resulted in a boundary so 
involved and so indistinct that it would have been impossible to 
exercise any supervision over it...."
Language o f this kind can only be construed as the considered 
expression o f a legal conception regarded by the Norwegian 
Government as compatible with international law. And indeed, the 
French Government did not pursue the matter. In a Note o f July 27th, 
1870, it is said that, while maintaining its standpoint with regard to 
principle, it was prepared to accept the delimitation laid down by the 
Decree of October 16th, 1869, as resting upon "a practical study o f the 
configuration o f the coast line and o f the conditions o f the 
inhabitants".
The Court, having thus established the existence and the 
constituent elements o f the Norwegian system o f delimitation, further 
finds that this system was consistently applied by Norwegian [p 137] 
authorities and that it encountered no opposition on the part o f other 
States.
The United Kingdom Government has however sought to show 
that the Norwegian Government has not consistently followed the 
principles o f delimitation which, it claims, form its system, and that it 
has admitted by implication that some other method would be 
necessary to comply with, international law. The documents to which 
the Agent o f the Government o f the United Kingdom principally 
referred at the hearing on October 20th, 1951, relate to the period 
between 1906 and 1908, the period in which British trawlers made 
their first appearance off the Norwegian coast, and which, therefore, 
merits particular attention.
The United Kingdom Government pointed out that the law o f
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June 2nd, 1906, which prohibited fishing by foreigners, merely 
forbade fishing in "Norwegian territorial waters", and it deduced from 
the very general character o f this reference that no definite system 
existed. The Court is unable to accept this interpretation, as the object 
of the law was to renew the prohibition against fishing and not to 
undertake a precise delimitation of the territorial sea.
The second document relied upon by the United Kingdom 
Government is a letter dated March 24th, 1908, from the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs to the Minister of National Defence. The United 
Kingdom Government thought that this letter indicated an adherence 
by Norway to the low-water mark rule contrary to the present 
Norwegian position. This interpretation cannot be accepted; it rests 
upon a confusion between the low-water mark rule as understood by 
the United Kingdom, which requires that all the sinuosities of the 
coast line at low tide should be followed, and the general practice of 
selecting the low-tide mark rather than that of the high tide for 
measuring the extent of the territorial sea.
The third document referred to is a Note, dated November nth, 
1908, from the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the French 
Charge d’Affaires at Christiania, in reply to a request for informa-tion 
as to whether Norway had modified the limits o f her territorial waters. 
In it the Minister said: "Interpreting Norwegian regulations in this 
matter, whilst at the same time conforming to the general rule o f the 
Law o f Nations, this Ministry gave its opinion that the distance from 
the coast should be measured from the low-water mark and that every 
islet not continuously covered by the sea should be reckoned as a 
starting-point." The United Kingdom Government argued that by the 
reference to "the general rule o f the Law of Nations", instead o f to its 
own system o f delimitation entailing the use o f straight lines, and, 
furthermore, by its statement that "every islet not continuously 
covered by the sea should be reckoned as a starting-point", the 
Norwegian Government had completely departed from what it to-day 
describes as its system, [p 138]
It must be remembered that the request for information to which 
the Norwegian Government was replying related not to the use of
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straight lines, but to the breadth o f Norwegian territorial waters. The 
point of the Norwegian Government’s reply was that there had been 
no modification in the Norwegian legislation. Moreover, it is 
impossible to rely upon a few words taken from a single note to draw 
the conclusion that the Norwegian Government had abandoned a 
position which its earlier official documents had clearly indicated.
The Court considers that too much importance need not be 
attached to the few uncertainties or contradictions, real or apparent, 
which the United Kingdom Government claims to have discovered in 
Norwegian practice. They may be easily understood in the light of the 
variety of the facts and conditions prevailing in the long period which 
has elapsed since 1812, and are not such as to modify the conclusions 
reached by the Court.
In the light o f these considerations, and in the absence o f 
convincing evidence to the contrary, the Court is bound to hold that 
the Norwegian authorities applied their system of delimitation con­
sistently and uninterruptedly from 1869 until the time when the 
dispute arose.
From the standpoint o f international law, it is now necessary to 
consider whether the application o f the Norwegian system 
encountered any opposition from foreign States.
Norway has been in a position to aigue without any 
contradiction that neither the promulgation of her delimitation 
Decrees in 1869 and in 1889, nor their application, gave rise to any 
opposition on the part o f foreign States. Since, moreover, these 
Decrees constitute, as has been shown above, the application of a 
well-defined and uniform system, it is indeed this system itself which 
would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical 
consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all States.
The general toleration of foreign States with regard to the 
Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact. For a period of more than 
sixty years the United Kingdom Government itself in no way 
contested it. One cannot indeed consider as raising objections the 
discussions to which the Uord Roberts incident gave rise in 1911, for 
the controversy which arose in this connection related to two
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questions, that o f the four-mile limit, and that o f Norwegian 
sovereignty over the Varangcrfjord, both of which were unconnected 
with the position o f base-lines. It would appear that it was only in its 
Memorandum of July 27th, 1933, that the United Kingdom made a 
formal and definite protest on this point.
The United Kingdom Government has argued that the 
Norwegian system of delimitation was not known to it and that the [p 
139] system therefore lacked the notoriety essential to provide the 
basis of an historic title enforceable against it. The Court is unable to 
accept this view. As a coastal State on the North Sea, greatly interested 
in the fisheries in this area, as a maritime Power traditionally 
concerned with the law of the sea and concerned particularly to defend 
the freedom of the seas, the United Kingdom could not have been 
ignorant of the Decree of 1869 which had at once provoked a request 
for explanations by the French Government. Nor, knowing of it, could 
it have been under any misapprehension as to the significance o f its 
terms, which clearly described it as constituting the application o f a 
system. The same observation applies a fortiori to the Decree o f 1889 
relating to the delimitation o f Romsdal and Nordmore which must 
have appeared to the United Kingdom as a reiterated manifestation of 
the Norwegian practice.
Norway’s attitude with regard to the North Sea Fisheries 
(Police) Convention o f 1882 is a further fact which must at once have 
attracted the attention o f Great Britain. There is scarcely any fisheries 
convention o f greater importance to the coastal States o f the North Sea 
or o f greater interest to Great Britain. Norway’s refusal to adhere to 
this Convention clearly raised the question o f the delimitation o f her 
maritime domain, especially with regard to bays, the question o f their 
delimitation by means o f straight lines o f which Norway challenged 
the maximum length adopted in the Convention. Having regard to the 
fact that a few years before, the delimitation o f Sunnmore by the 1869 
Decree had been presented as an application o f the Norwegian system, 
one cannot avoid the conclusion that, from that time on, all the 
elements of the problem of Norwegian coastal waters had been clearly 
stated. The steps subsequently taken by Great Britain to secure
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Norway’s adherence to the Convention clearly show that she was 
aware o f and interested in the question.
The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only 
be strengthened with the passage o f time, the United Kingdom 
Government refrained from formulating reservations.
The notoriety o f the facts, the general toleration o f the 
international community, Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her 
own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in 
any case warrant Norway’s enforcement of her system against the 
United Kingdom.
The Court is thus led to conclude that the method of straight 
lines, established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the 
peculiar geography o f the Norwegian coast; that even before the 
dispute arose, this method had been consolidated by a constant and 
sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude o f 
governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to 
be contrary to international law. [p 140]
The question now arises whether the Decree o f July 12th, 1935, 
which in its preamble is expressed to be an application o f this method, 
conforms to it in its drawing o f the base-lines, or whether, at certain 
points, it departs from this method to any considerable extent.
The schedule appended to the Decree o f July 12th, 1935, 
indicates the fixed points between which the straight base-lines are 
drawn. The Court notes that these lines were the result o f  a careful 
study initiated by the Norwegian authorities as far back as 1911. The 
base-lines recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee o f the 
Storting for the delimitation o f the fisheries zone and adopted and 
made public for the first time by the Decree o f July 12th, 1935, are the 
same as those which the so-called Territorial Waters Boundary 
Commissions, successively appointed on June 29th, 19-11, and July 
12th, 1912, had drawn in 1912forFinnm arkandin 1913 for Nordland 
and Troms. The Court further notes that the 1911 and 1912 
Commissions advocated these lines and in so doing constantly 
referred, as the 1935 Decree itself did, to the traditional system o f
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delimitation adopted by earlier acts and more particularly by the 
Decrees o f 1812, 1869 and 1889.
In the absence o f convincing evidence to the contrary, the Court 
cannot readily find that the lines adopted in these circumstances by the 
1935 Decree are not in accordance with the traditional Norwegian 
system. However, a purely factual difference arose between the Parties 
concerning the three following base-points : No. 21 (Vesterfallet i 
Gaasan), No. 27 (Tokkebaaen) and No. 39 (Nordboen). This 
difference is now devoid o f object. A telegram dated October 19th, 
1951, from the Hydrographic Service o f Norway to the Agent o f the 
Norwegian Government, which was communicated to the Agent of 
the United Kingdom Government, has confirmed that these three 
points are rocks which are not continuously submerged. Since this 
assertion has not been further disputed by the United Kingdom 
Government, it may be considered that the use o f these rocks as base- 
points is in conformity with the traditional Norwegian system.
Finally, it has been contended by the United Kingdom 
Government that certain, at least, o f the base-lines adopted by the 
Decree are, irrespective of whether or not they conform to the 
Norwegian system, contrary to the principles stated above by the 
Court as governing any delimitation o f the territorial sea. The Court 
will consider whether, from the point o f view of these principles, 
certain of the base-lines which have been criticized in some detail 
really are without justification.
The Norwegian Government admits that the base-lines must be 
drawn in such a way as to respect the general direction of the [p 141] 
coast and that they must be drawn in a reasonable manner. The United 
Kingdom Government contends that certain lines do not follow the 
general direction of the coast, or do not follow it sufficiently closely, 
or that they do not respect the natural connection existing between 
certain sea areas and the land formations separating or surrounding 
them. For these reasons, it is alleged that the line drawn is contrary to 
the principles which govern the delimitation of the maritime domain.
The Court observes that these complaints, which assumed a 
very general scope in the written proceedings, have subsequently
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been reduced.
The United Kingdom Government has directed its criticism more 
particularly against two sectors, the delimitation of which they 
represented as extreme cases of deviation from the general direction of 
the coast: the sector of Svaerholthavet (between base-points n and 12) 
and that of Lopphavet (between base-points 20 and 21). The Court will 
deal with the delimitation of these two sectors from this point of view.
The base-line between points n and 12, which is 38.6 sea miles in 
length, delimits the waters of the Svasrholt lying between Cape Nordkyn 
and the North Cape. The United Kingdom Government denies that the 
basin so delimited has the character of a bay. Its argument is founded on 
a geographical consideration. In its opinion, the calculation of the basin’s 
penetration inland must stop at the tip of the Svaerholt peninsula 
(Svserholtklubben). The penetration inland thus obtained being only n.5 
sea miles, as against 38.6 miles of breadth at the entrance, it is alleged 
that the basin in question does not have the character o f a bay. The Court 
is unable to share this view. It considers that the basin in question must 
be contemplated in the light of all the geographical factors involved. The 
fact that a peninsula juts out and forms two wide fjords, the Lakse-fjord 
and the Porsangerfjord, cannot deprive the basin of the character o f a 
bay. It is the distances between the disputed baseline and the most inland 
point o f these fjords, 50 and 75 sea miles respectively, which must be 
taken into account in appreciating the proportion between the 
penetration inland and the width at the mouth. The Court concludes that 
Svasrholthavct has the character o f a bay.
The delimitation o f the Lopphavet basin has also been criticized 
by the United Kingdom. As has been pointed out above, its criticism 
o f the selection o f base point No. 21 may be regarded as abandoned. 
The Lopphavet basin constitutes an ill-defined geographic whole. It 
cannot be regarded as having the character o f a bay. It is made up o f 
an extensive area o f water dotted with large islands which are 
separated by inlets that terminate in the various fjords. The base-line 
has been challenged on the ground that it does not respect the general 
direction o f the coast. It should be observed that, however justified the 
rule in question may be, [p 142] it is devoid o f any mathematical
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precision. In order properly to apply the rule, regard must be had for 
the relation between the deviation complained o f and what, according 
to the terms o f the rule, must be regarded as the general direction of 
the coast. Therefore, one cannot confine oneself to examining one 
sector o f the coast alone, except in a case o f manifest abuse; nor can 
one rely on the impression that may be gathered from a large scale 
chart o f this sector alone. In the case in point, the divergence between 
the base-line and the land formations is not such that it is a distortion 
o f the general direction o f the Norwegian coast.
Even if  it were considered that in the sector under review the 
deviation was too pronounced, it must be pointed out that the 
Norwegian Government has relied upon an historic title clearly 
referable to the waters o f Lopphavet, namely, the exclusive privilege 
to fish and hunt whales granted at the end o f the 17th century to Lt - 
Commander Erich Lorch under a number o f licences which show, 
inter alia, that the water situated in the vicinity o f the sunken rock of 
Gjesbaaen or Gjesboene and the fishing grounds pertaining thereto 
were regarded as falling exclusively within Norwegian sovereignty. 
But it may be observed that the fishing grounds here referred to are 
made up o f two banks, one of which, the Indre Gjesboene, is situated 
between the base-line and the limit reserved for fishing, whereas the 
other, the Ytre Gjesboene, is situated further to seaward and beyond 
the fishing limit laid down in the 1935 Decree.
These ancient concessions tend to confirm the Norwegian 
Government’s contention that the fisheries zone reserved before 1812 
was in fact much more extensive than the one delimited in 1935. It is 
suggested that it included all fishing banks from which land was 
visible, the range o f vision being, as is recognized by the United 
Kingdom Government, the principle of delimitation in force at that 
time. The Court considers that, although it is not always clear to what 
specific areas they apply, the historical data produced in support of 
this contention by the Norwegian Govem-ment lend some weight to 
the idea o f the survival of traditional rights reserved to the inhabitants 
of the Kingdom over fishing grounds included in the 1935 
delimitation, particularly in the case of Lopphavet. Such rights,
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founded on the vital needs of the population and attested by very 
ancient and peaceful usage, may legitimately be taken into account in 
drawing a line which, moreover, appears to the Court to have been 
kept within the bounds of what is moderate and reasonable.
As to the Vestfjord. after the oral argument, its delimitation no 
longer presents the importance it had in the early stages of tire 
proceedings. Since the Court has found that the waters of the Indreleia 
are internal waters, the waters of the Vestljord. as indeed the waters of all 
other Norwegian fjords, can only be regarded as internal w aters, hr these 
circumstances, what-[p 143] ever difference may still exist between tire 
views of the United Kingdom Government and those of the Norwegian 
Government on this point, is negligible. It is reduced to the question 
whether the base-line should be drawn between points 45 and 46 as 
fixed by the 1935 Decree, or whether tire line should terminate at the 
Kalsholmen lighthouse on Tenholnreme. Tire Court considers that this 
question is purely local in character and of secondary importance, and 
that its settlement should be left to the coastal State.
For these reasons. Tire Court, rejecting all submissions to the 
contrary, Finds by ten votes to tw o. that the method employed for the 
delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal Norw egian Decree of 
July 12th, 1935. is not contrary to international law: and by eight 
votes to four, that the base-lines fixed by the said Decree in 
application of this method are not contrary to international law-.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at 
the Peace Palace. Tire Hague, this eighteenth day of December, one 
thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, in three copies, one of which will 
be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and to the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, respectively.
(Signed) Basdevant.
President.
(Signed) E. Hambro.
Registrar.
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